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Abstract
We report empirical evidence indicating that US business formation has recently turned
more volatile, procyclical and persistent due to changes in exit dynamics. To study these
stylized facts, we estimate a DSGE model with endogenous entry and exit. Business units
feature heterogeneous productivity and they shut down if the present value of expected
future dividends falls below the current liquidation value. The estimation results imply
structural changes in US exit dynamics after 2007: the semi-elasticity of the exit rate to
critical productivity has increased and the average plant-level productivity has decreased.
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1 Introduction
A decline in business formation and entrepreneurial activity has characterized the US economy
in recent years (Hathaway and Litan, 2014; Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2016),
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(2017)). In this regard, we report two new stylized facts. First, business formation has turned
more volatile, procyclical and persistent after the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-08 than what had
previously been observed during the Great Moderation period. Second, the dynamics of business
destruction (exit) accounts for the previous facts substantially more than business creation (entry).
Following the seminal work of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008), recent macroeconomic mod-
els have incorporated the extensive margin of aggregate ﬂuctuations. The analysis conveyed in
our paper belongs to the growing literature on sticky-price models, and extends the analysis of
Lewis and Poilly (2012) and Lewis and Stevens (2015) to account for the above mentioned stylized
facts.1 Lewis and Poilly (2012) consider the extensive margin in a Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model to analyze monetary policy and business cycles. In addition, Lewis
and Stevens (2015) provide a quantitative exploration of the extensive margin of activity by es-
timating a DSGE-style model with Bayesian econometrics. However, as a common feature, these
papers assume a constant rate of exit which leaves business formation mostly driven by ﬂuctua-
tions in the rate of entry. The variability in the rate of exit observed in the data is, however, at
odds with the constant rate of exit rate formulation.
Hence, the ﬁrst contribution of our paper on the modelling side is to introduce an intertemporal
exit rate decision that takes into account the liquidation value of the ﬁrm and expected dividends.
Remarkably, while the entry of new ﬁrms/goods has been widely documented in DSGE models,
few papers have proposed an analysis of ﬁrms exit.2 Recently, Cavallari (2015) and Hamano and
Zanetti (2017) have proposed endogenous exit of ﬁrms motivated by reasons diﬀerent than ours.3
These attempts, however, turn out to be not satisfactory in addressing the stylized facts in the
post-2008 ﬁnancial crisis period. In Hamano and Zanetti (2017), for example, the exit decision is
based upon current value of proﬁts and it neglects the liquidation cost associated with exit. This
feature makes the exit decision intratemporal. In another recent paper, Cavallari (2015) considers
scrap values, which are time-invariant and ﬁrm speciﬁc, in the exit decision. By contrast, we
introduce heterogeneity through ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity and the liquidation value varies over
time. This formulation has the advantage that we can assess how both the heterogeneity of
incumbents and changes in the liquidation value can shape the intertemporal exit decision.
In our model, the exit rate depends on the productivity threshold that gives a continuation
1There have been also many papers that incorporate business formation in a ﬂexible-price setup such as Devereux,
Head and Lapham (1996), Campbell (1998), Samaniego (2008), Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012), Clementi and
Palazzo (2016), and Fattal-Jaef (2018).
2Previous examples of endogenous exit in ﬂexible price settings include Hopenhayn (1992), Jaimovich (2007),
Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008), and Samaniego (2008).
3An early working paper by Totzek (2009) developed a model with endogenous business destruction.
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value higher than the liquidation value. At the end of the production period, the business unit
remains in the industry if the present value of all expected dividends exceeds the liquidation value.4
In the opposite case, the business unit exits the industry, the production of its variety ends and
there is business destruction. We also explore the connections between business formation and
inﬂation dynamics by incorporating the sticky-price structure a la Calvo (1983), instead of using
Rotemberg (1982)’s price adjustment costs traditionally adopted in other papers with extensive
margin.5
The second contribution on our paper is that we provide a quantitative evaluation of the role
of endogenous entry and exit in DSGE models.6 Using Bayesian econometrics, we estimate our
model with US quarterly data between 1993 and 2016. The model performs well on replicating
business creation and destruction observed in recent US cycles: the posterior estimates generate
model simulations that provide a good matching on the second-moment statistics of US entry, exit
and net business formation. In the variance decomposition, the sources of ﬂuctuations for entry
and exit are rather diﬀerent. The entry rate ﬂuctuations are mainly consequence of demand-side
shocks while supply-side shocks, by contrast, have a large impact on the exit rate. Shocks on the
entry cost and on the liquidation value are additional sources of US aggregate ﬂuctuations that
were not accounted in conventional DSGE model. We ﬁnd that they jointly explain 10% of the
variability of the quarterly rate of growth of US real GDP.
We also estimate the model for the Great Recession period (2006-2013). In line with what
is observed in the data, the exit dynamics of the model changes in the Great Recession. Thus,
we ﬁnd that the sensitivity of the exit rate to the critical productivity rises substantially. This
makes the aggregate exit rate be more sensitive to the state of the economy as the number of
incumbents shutting down responds more aggressively to changes in market conditions (interest
rates, expected cost of production, expected demand, etc.).
There are microeconomic implications from our estimated macro model due to the hetero-
geneity of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. Actually, we identify the business units of our model (ﬁrms)
with establishments that produce a single diﬀerentiated good with a speciﬁc productivity. The
estimates of the structural parameters (using data on US private establishments) tell us on the
allocation and characteristics of US businesses. Hence, the increase in the exit rate elasticity after
4Bernard et al. (2010) assume a similar decision making for exit in a model with multi-product ﬁrms.
5Cavallari (2015) also assumes Calvo (1983)-type price rigidities. However, in our setting, we reach a diﬀerent
expression for the New Keynesian Phillips curve because of diﬀerences in the production technology for both existing
and new goods.
6To our knowledge, this exercise is only conducted in a model with an extensive margin of activity by Lewis
and Stevens (2015) but they assume a constant and exogenous exit rate.
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2007 is explained by a higher estimated value of the shape parameter in the Pareto distribution of
US establishments. This result indicates a concentration of establishments closer to the minimal
productivity, i.e. there is a greater density of low-productivity establishments. We ﬁnd that the
estimated average productivity of US establishments falls from 1.72 in the full sample period to
1.49 during the Great Recession.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines key stylized facts on business
formation in the US cyclical ﬂuctuations that motivate empirically our paper. Section 3 presents
the baseline model with a special focus on the processes of business creation and destruction.
Section 4 introduces the Bayesian estimation strategy and provides the posterior estimates of the
structural parameters for the US economy taking the full sample period (1993-2016). Section 5
presents the analysis of second-moment statistics, impulse response functions and variance decom-
position to evaluate the business cycle properties of the model. Section 6 carries out a quantitative
exploration of the structural changes observed in entry and exit dynamics during the Great Re-
cession (2007-2016). Section 7 concludes with the summary of the most relevant ﬁndings of the
paper.
2 Empirical motivation
Figure 1 displays the evolution of business formation in the US from 1993 to 2016 through the
plots of several quarterly time series obtained from the Business Employment Dynamics database
released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).7 Business units are represented in the data
through establishments, which are deﬁned by the BLS as “the physical location of a certain
economic activity–for example, a factory, mine, store, or oﬃce. A single establishment generally
produces a single good or provides a single service.”. Our choice of establishments to measure
business formation is due to the fact that other candidates such as ﬁrms or enterprises may be
the collection of multiple establishments.8 The creation or destruction of establishments within
multi-establishment ﬁrms would have no eﬀect observed in the data.
On the upper-left cell, Figure 1 plots Total Private Establishments (TPE). The quarterly
change of TPE is the result of adding up the establishment births (Entry) and subtracting the
establishment deaths (Exit).9 Taking the mean of TPE change along the whole period, we ﬁnd
7All the data from the Business Employment Dynamics report are available for free access in
https://www.bls.gov/bdm/
8The BLS indicates that "an enterprise (a private ﬁrm, government, or nonproﬁt organization) can consist of a
single establishment or multiple establishments".
9The BLS deﬁnes establishment births are as those establishments that had positive employment for the ﬁrst
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Figure 1: Quarterly time series from US business formation.
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that 25,589 establishments were added on average every quarter, which represents 0.46% of total
units 1993. The observations that belong to the 1990’s decade show strong and steady business
formation: there was always positive net business creation from 1993 to the end of 2001. The
last quarter of 2001 reports the ﬁrst negative change in the number of establishments with a
net business destruction of 2,200 establishments. As Figure 1 shows, the number of exits was
catching up the number of entries from the beginning of the millennium and in 2001:4 the number
of establishment closings increased by 7,000 units (from 212,000 to 219,000).10 During 2002,
exit moves substantially down and a period of strong business formation emerges. This business
expansion would last until 2007, fueled by low interest rates and the housing bubble, with net
business creation of more than 30,000 establishments in many quarters of the housing boom
(2003-06). The early stages of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007 were characterized by an increasing
amount of establishment deaths while births still remained high for a while. The recession hit
really hard on business destruction in the ﬁrst two quarters of 2009, right after the ﬁnancial
turmoil and the credit crunch of the Fall of 2008 (the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy ﬁle happened
on September 15th, 2008); the number of establishments destroyed in those two quarters were
58,600 and 64,100, respectively. The exit rate skyrocketed to 3.5% of total private establishments
in 2008:4 (from 2.7% in 2006) while the entry rate moved downwards from 3.2% at the beginning
of 2007 to 2.7% by the end of 2009 (see the lower-right panel of Figure 1). As 2009 went by, the
number of exits fell to historically normal levels while entry showed signals of recovery. Over the
remaining quarters (between 2010 and 2016), there is some net business creation (about 20,000
establishments per quarter). The lower-left panel of Figure 1 plots the rate of growth of TPE
together with real GDP growth, both of them in per-capita terms.11 The plots indicate a much
clearer co-movement between business formation and economic growth over the Great Recession
period (2007-2016) than in earlier periods. Furthermore, net business creation occurs with some
time lag (1-2 quarters) with respect to GDP growth.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the rate of growth of TPE per capita, the rate of
establishment entry and the rate of establishment exit for the total sample period (1996-2013),
and for the subsamples that belong to either the Great Moderation (1996-2006) or the Great
time in the third month of the current quarter with no link to the previous three quarters to exclude seasonal
reopenings. Establishment deaths are establishments that reported positive employment in the third month of the
previous three quarters and zero employment in the current quarter to include only closings that go out of business
permanently, excluding seasonal shutdowns.
10The September 11th tragic terrorist attacks occurred in the last quarter of 2001.
11The series have been obtained in per capita terms because the observed series used in the model estimation
come in per-capita terms to be consistent with the way macro variables are introduced in the model.
6
Recession (2007-2016). The rate of entry is calculated as the percent ratio between private sector
establishment births and TPE, whereas the rate of exit is the percentage of establishment deaths
over TPE. Figure 2 displays a rolling 10-year (40-quarter) window calculation of statistics of
volatility (relative standard deviation), procyclicality (correlation with real GDP growth) and
persistence (autocorrelation of order 1) for the same three variables reported in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics from US business formation
Full sample
1993:2-2016:2
Great Moderation
1993:2-2006:4
Great Recession
2007:1-2016:2
Rate of growth of Total Private Establishments per capita
Mean, % 0.11 0.21 -0.05
Std. deviation, % 0.36 0.27 0.43
Std. deviation wrt real GDP growth 0.60 0.55 0.64
Corr. with real GDP growth 0.34 0.03 0.42
Autocorrelation 0.37 0.00 0.49
Rate of Establishment Entry
Mean, % 3.21 3.38 2.97
Std. deviation, % 0.24 0.12 0.15
Std. deviation wrt real GDP growth 0.40 0.24 0.23
Corr. with real GDP growth 0.34 -0.02 0.03
Autocorrelation 0.87 0.47 0.65
Rate of Establishment Exit
Mean, % 2.92 2.96 2.85
Std. deviation, % 0.21 0.15 0.26
Std. deviation wrt real GDP growth 0.35 0.31 0.40
Corr. with real GDP growth -0.31 -0.33 -0.56
Autocorrelation 0.82 0.67 0.88
The means of the three variables fall in the Great Recession (2007-2016) compared to the
Great Moderation period 1993-2006. In fact, the average value of the quarterly rate of growth of
TPE per capita becomes slightly negative during the Great Recession (-0.03%) from a 0.21% value
within the expansionary period 1993-2006. The decline of the entry rate strongly contributes to
the fall of the average quarterly business formation as its mean falls from 3.38% to 2.97% as a
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Figure 2: Statistics from US business formation in a 10-year rolling window starting in 1993.
signal of the decline of entrepreneurial activity in the US economy (Decker et al., 2016).12 The
exit rate also falls, although it does so to a lesser extent from an average of 2.96% in 1993-2006
to 2.85% in the Great Recession.
Figure 2 and Table 1 show two remarkable stylized facts on the second-moment statistics.
First, TPE growth turns more volatile, more procyclical and more persistent after the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2007. As the upper cells of Figure 2 show, the standard deviation of TPE growth (in
relative terms to real GDP growth), the correlation with real GDP growth and the autocorrelation
climb signiﬁcantly in the 10-year subsample that begins around 1998 which precisely includes the
ﬁnancial crisis. As additional quarters of the Great Recession are included, the ﬂuctuations of
TPE growth report similar statistics. Thus, when only considering the Great Recession period
(2007-2016) the relative standard deviation of TPE growth is higher than in the whole period.
Similarly, the correlation between TPE and real GDP growth is higher in the Great Recession and
the autocorrelation also becomes higher. Remarkably, there was no inertia in TPE growth before
the ﬁnancial crisis (see the upper-right cell of Figure 2).
12As another piece of evidence on this, the average quarterly rate of growth of real GDP per capita within the
whole sample period was 0.35%, whereas TPE growth per capita only grew at a quarterly average of 0.11%.
8
Second, the exit rate turns more volatile, more countercyclical and more persistent after the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2007. Table 1 reports these substantial changes in the standard deviation, the
correlation with respect to real GDP growth and the autocorrelation of the exit rate during the
Great Recession (2007-2016). Likewise, Figure 2 indicates increasing patterns for the exit relative
volatility and persistence, and also a stronger opposite comovement between the entry rate and real
GDP growth. Meanwhile, as Figure 2 shows, the business cycle patterns of volatility, cyclicality
and inertia of the entry rate are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the periods examined (they swing
back towards the intial levels at the end of the period). Regarding volatility and autocorrelation,
Table 1 reports very similar numbers for the entry rate across samples.13
Taking these empirical ﬁndings together, the following conclusions emerge: the evolution of the
exit rate in the Great Recession explains why TPE growth becomes more volatile, sensitive to the
cycle and persistent, whereas the role of the entry rate in explaining these recent changes for TPE
growth is minor. Hence, the exit rate becomes crucial to explain the increasing role of business
formation on aggregate ﬂuctuations during the Great Recession. Next, we develop a model with
ﬁrm turnover that accounts for both endogenous entry and exit rates.
3 A DSGE model with endogenous business formation
The model represents an economy populated by households, ﬁrms, and the public sector (govern-
ment and central bank). There are monopolistically competitive markets for goods and labor and
perfectly competitive asset markets of capital, equity shares and government bonds. Households
purchase bundles of consumption goods, set nominal wages, supply one speciﬁc labor service, own
assets and decide on business creation and destruction. Remarkably, the number of varieties in
the goods market changes over time as a result of ﬂows of entry and exit of diﬀerentiated goods.
Meanwhile, ﬁrms produce and set the price of a diﬀerentiated consumption good, and demand
bundles of labor services and capital to be used in a technology with ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity.
Several sources of rigidities and frictions are assumed to enhance the empirical ﬁt of the model
following Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). The set of real rigidities include
consumption habits, adjustment costs on investment, and variable capital utilization. Regarding
nominal rigidities, we consider a ﬁxed probability of not being able to optimally adjust both prices
and wages as in Calvo (1983).
13It may be noticed that the autocorrelation of the rate of establishment entry is higher in the whole sample
period 1993-2016 than in either subsample. This fact can be explained by the downwards trend that the entry rate
shows from 2002 to 2008 which splits up between the two subsample periods.
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3.1 The extensive margin
Conventional DSGE models (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007) assume a constant number of pro-
duction units and the only way for adjusting aggregate production is through the intensive-margin
change in the amount produced by the ﬁxed number of incumbents. We assume that the number
of establishments can vary over time. This realistic assumption opens up the extensive margin for
aggregate output ﬂuctuations.
Following Bilbiie et al. (2012), each ﬁrm is specialized in the production of one speciﬁc good
within a single location (establishment). It leads to a convenient setup in which the total number
of goods, ﬁrms and establishments is the same. Formally, there are nt−1 varieties of consumption
goods (ﬁrms, establishments) at the end of period t − 1. Over the next period t, households
decide to shut down the production lines of nxt goods (ﬁrms, establishments) which exit from the
market, while the remaining nst goods (ﬁrms, establishments) survive and continue operating in
the market. Hence, we have
nt−1 = n
x
t + n
s
t , (1)
which implies the following exit rate
xt = n
x
t /nt−1, (2)
and its complimentary survival rate
1− xt = n
s
t/nt−1.
Households decide how much to invest in the creation of new establishments.14 A one-period
time-to-build requirement is assumed in the portfolio choice for establishment creation. Thus, the
desired number of entries net must be decided by households in period t − 1. At the beginning
of period t, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity draws are released for all the new establishments. As
we will show later, these draws determine the number of establishments that survive to the birth
period, i.e. the number of eﬀective entries n
s
t
nt−1
net . Therefore, applying the survival rate, n
s
t/nt−1,
to both the active lines of production at the end of the previous period and the new desired
establishments brings this law of motion
nt =
nst
nt−1
(nt−1 + n
e
t) = n
s
t +
nst
nt−1
net , (3)
which gives the total number of productive establishments at the beginning of period t, nt, as the
number of incumbents that remain alive, nst , plus the eﬀective number of entries
nst
nt−1
net . The rate
14See the technical appendix for the optimizing programs of both households and ﬁrms.
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of eﬀective entry is deﬁned as follows
et =
nst
nt−1
net
nt−1
. (4)
The deﬁnitions of both et and xt imply that the rate of growth of total establisments (net business
formation) coincides with the diﬀerence between the eﬀective entry rate and the exit rate,
nt − nt−1
nt−1
= et − xt
Next, let us describe separately the endogenous determination of the ﬂows of entry and exit.
Business creation (entry)
Following Bilbiie et al. (2012), Casares and Poutineau (2014), Cavallari (2015), or Lewis and
Stevens (2015), the free-entry decision is based on the comparison between the prospective equity
value and the cost of entry. Unlike those papers, the cost of entry is not obtained here from the
marginal cost of production or from any speciﬁc production function. We assume that the cost is a
combination of the licence fee and start-up variable costs. In particular, we have this speciﬁcation
to determine the unit cost of business creation in period t
exp (εet) f
e + ect,
where εet is an AR(1) exogenous shock, f
e is the unit real cost of a license fee required by the
government to begin the production of a new variety, and ect is a variable congestion cost for
start-ups which increases with the desired entry rate as follows
ect = Θ

net+1
nt
ς
, (5)
setting parameter values Θ > 0 and ς > 1 for convexity.15 In the portfolio choice of the represen-
tative household (see technical appendix), the ﬁrst order conditions of the number of entries and
equity investment are, respectively,
λtvt = βEtλt+1

nst+1
nt
(dt+1 + vt+1) +
nxt+1
nt
lvt+1

, (6)
λt (exp (ε
e
t) f
e + ect) = βEtλt+1

nst+1
nt
(dt+1 + vt+1) +
nxt+1
nt
lvt+1

, (7)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint, vt is the average (expected) equity
value, β is the household discount factor, dt+1 is the expected dividend in period t+ 1 if the ﬁrm
15The desired entry rate in period t is expressed as net+1/nt because households decide on business creation one
period in advance.
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survives and lvt+1 is the expected liquidation value in period t+1 if the ﬁrm dies. As observed in
the right hand side of conditions (6) and (7), the expected marginal beneﬁt combines the returns in
the scenarios of survival, Et

nst+1
nt
(dt+1 + vt+1)

, and death, Et

nxt+1
nt
lvt+1

which are common for
both newly created establishments and incumbents.16 The aggregate survival rate,
nst+1
nt
, and the
aggregate exit rate,
nxt+1
nt
, are, respectively, the probabilities of remaining and leaving the industry.
Combining (6) and (7) results in the free-entry equilibrium condition
exp (εet) f
e + ect = vt, (8)
which equates the marginal cost of entry to its expected marginal beneﬁt. A log-linear approx-
imation to the free entry condition (8) that incorporates the entry cost function (5) brings the
following equation for log deviations of entry with respect to its steady state level17
net+1 = nt + 1ς  vecvt − feec εet	 , (9)
where v and ec are the steady-state levels for average equity and the congestion cost of entry,
respectively. Thus, households decide to raise their spending on the creation of new goods when
they observe an increase in the average equity value, vt. Firm-speciﬁc productivity will be observed
ex post and the expected return of new establishments is the current average equity value. By
contrast, if the exogenous component of the cost of entry, εet , increases the number of new goods
created by the households is going to fall. The elasticity of the congestion entry cost ς modulates
the response of log ﬂuctuations of desired entry, net+1, to both driving factors, vt and εet .
Using in (6) the ﬁrst order condition of the government bond,
λt
exp

εbt
	
(1 + rt)
= βEtλt+1,
where rt is the real interest rate of the government bond and ε
b
t is an exogenous risk-premium
16The expected return is the same for incumbents and start-ups because our model does not contemplate the role
of generating new ideas or investing on R&D as the motivating lines to create new goods or ﬁrms. Schumpeterian
processes of creative destruction or Romer-type connections between the total number of varieties and possible
gains in the stock of knowledge could be introduced as model extensions. In the Schumpeterian case, we could
have a link between business churning (replacement of low-productivity ﬁrms for other new and more eﬃcient
businesses) and the technology shock. Alternatively, the innovations of technology shocks could also be aﬀected
by the rise of varieties as suggested by Romer (1990), or even Arrow (1962)’s learning-by-doing could be a link
between technological growth and the accumulation of capital goods as a driver for knowledge spillover.
17Throughout the paper, we follow the standard notation of variables topped with a hat sign “” to denote log
ﬂuctuations with respect to its level in the balanced-growth steady state, whereas variables with no time subscript
denote the steady state level along the balanced-growth path.
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shock, gives the equilibrium equity value
vt =
nst+1
nt
(dt+1 + vt+1) +
nxt+1
nt
lvt+1
exp

εbt
	
(1 + rt)
,
and its loglinear approximation is
vt = βγv1Etvt+1+βγv2Et dt+1+βγ (v1 + v2)Etnst+1+βγv3Et nxt+1 + lvt+1−rt + εbt	−nt. (10)
The coeﬃcients v1, v2, v3 > 0 depend on the structural parameters, and γ > 0 is the long-run rate
of economic growth.18
For the entry rate equation, we can take a semi-loglinear approximation to its deﬁnition (4),19
and use the lagged version of the business creation dynamics (9) to obtain
et − e =
e
ς

v
ec
vt−1 − feec εet−1	+ e (nst − nt−1) . (11)
Hence, equation (11) and a lagged version of equation (10) together govern the entry dynamics
of the model.
Business destruction (exit)
As one of the main contributions of this paper, exit is endogenously determined from rational
behavior. Single-good establishments (ﬁrms) produce with a speciﬁc productivity dealt from a
Pareto distribution. The productivity draw, z, is released after making the decision on entry and
it remains for all future periods. The probability density function, g (z), of the Pareto distribution
of productivity draws is
g (z) =

κ(zmin)
κ
zκ+1
, if z ≥ zmin
0, if z < zmin
 ,
where zmin is the minimum productivity and κ is a parameter that determines the density or
concentration of establishments with low productivity (i.e., close to zmin). As proved in the
technical appendix, the average establishment-level productivity is constant at the value
z = zκmin  κκ−(θp−1)1/(θp−1) ,
which requires the technical constraint κ > (θp − 1).
At the end of the production period, a survival test is faced at each incumbent establishment.
Those single goods produced under low-eﬃciency technologies are at risk of business termination
18In particular, v1 =
v
(1−δn)(d+v)+δnlv
, v2 =
d
(1−δn)(d+v)+δnlv
and v3 =
δnlv/(1−δn)
(1−δn)(d+v)+δnlv
. See the technical
appendix for further details.
19The semi-loglinear approximation to (4) brings et − e = e (net − nt−1) + e (nst − nt−1) .
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due to the lack of proﬁtability over the prospective business cycles. Concretely, if the present
value of all expected dividends exceeds the liquidation value, the owner of the establishment (the
representative household) will decide continuation for the production line of the single good. In
the opposite case, the household will decide to shut down the production of that variety. Hence,
the representative establishment ω at period t faces the following choice
Et
∞
j=1
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) dt+j (ω) ≥ lvt, → Survive,
Et
∞
j=1
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) dt+j (ω) < lvt, → Exit,
where βt,t+j is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and t+j, st,t+j (ω) is the probability
of survival for a period that runs from t to t + j, dt+j (ω) is the future dividend in period t + j,
and lvt is the current liquidation value. At the margin, there would be a critical value of ﬁrm-level
productivity, zcrt (ω), for which the expected dividend stream exactly coincides with the liquidation
value,
Et
∞
j=1
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) d
cr
t+j (ω) = lvt. (12)
The parity equation (12) holds for the representative establishment at one critical value of speciﬁc
productivity, zcrt (ω). Assuming Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)’s monopolistic competition, we can
rewrite (12) as follows
Et
∞
j=1
βt+jst+j (ω)

Pt+j (ω)
P ct+j

−θp
yt+j

Pt+j (ω)
P ct+j
−mccrt+j (ω)

= lvt, (12’)
where Pt+j (ω) /P
c
t+j = ρt+j (ω) is the relative price in terms of consumption bundles, yt+j is the
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate output, and the critical vale zcrt (ω) is embedded in the denominator of the
real marginal cost, mccrt+j (ω). Even though the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity of the ω establishment,
z (ω), is constant, it is worth noticing that its productivity threshold, zcrt (ω), is time dependent due
to the variability in expected relative prices, aggregate output, marginal costs, or the liquidation
value that enters (12).
As proved in the technical appendix, mccrt+j (ω) is proportional to the real marginal cost for the
establishment that produces with the average productivity z
mccrt+j (ω) =
z
zcrt (ω)
mct+j. (13)
Using (13) and loglinearizing (12’), we can obtain the following forward-looking loglinear equation
for the ﬂuctuations of zcrt (ω),
20
zcrt = z1Etzcrt+1 + z2Etmct+1 − z3Etyt+1 + z3 rt + εbt	− z4Etρt+1 + z5 lvt − βγsEt lvt+1 (14)
20The detailed derivation is available in the technical appendic. It should be noticed that in the original non-
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where zi > 0 for i = 1, ..., 5 are coeﬃcients that depend on the structural parameters.
21 Equation
(14) shows that the value of log ﬂuctuations in the average expected real marginal costs, mct+1,
raises zcrt . This occurs because the expected dividends will be lower. By contrast, increases in the
expected aggregate demand, yt+1, and a higher expected unit revenue from sales, ρt+1 = P t+1− P ct+1
reduce zcrt as they both raise the average expected dividend. If either the real interest rate, rt, or
the exogenous risk premium, εbt, goes up the present value of future dividends turns lower (higher
discount factor) and the required critical productivity moves up. Finally, any increase in the
current liquidation value relative to its next period’s expected value increases zcrt because of the
higher return on exit.
The liquidation value is obtained as the non-sunk fraction of the licence fee paid at entry, f e,
adjusted by a liquidation shock, εxt ,
lvt = exp (ε
x
t ) (1− τ)f
e, (15)
where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 is the sunk fraction of the entry fee. Taking logs in (15) results in this simple
expression for log ﬂuctuations of the liquidation value
lvt = εxt , (16)
which leaves the dynamic equation for critical productivity (14) as follows
zcrt = z1Etzcrt+1 + z2Etmct+1 − z3Etyt+1 + z3 rt + εbt	− z4Etρt+1 + z5 (1− ρxβγs) εxt , (17)
introducing the coeﬃcient of autocorrelation of the AR(1) liquidation shock |ρx| < 1. As in Ghironi
and Melitz (2005), the critical productivity splits up the fraction of establishments that survive
from those that exit at the end of period t, according to the properties of the Pareto distribution.
Thus, the exit rate, xt = n
x
t /nt−1, depends positively on the productivity threshold z
cr
t
xt = 1−

zmin
zcrt
κ
,
which, in semi-loglinear terms, implies that exit rate deviations are given by this expression
xt − x = κ (1− x) zcrt (18)
where κ (1− x) deﬁnes the semi-elasticity of the exit rate to the critical productivity.
Thus, equations (18) and (17) together govern the exit dynamics of the model.
linear relationships that determine zcrt (ω) there are diﬀerences depending upon the relative establishment-speciﬁc
productivity and the history of pricing. Such wedges are constant proportions and do not show up after taking the
loglinear approximations.
21The structural coeﬃcients of (14) are z1 =

βγs+ κ(1−βγs)(ρ−mcz/z
cr)
mcz/zcr

, z2 = (1− βγs), z3 =
(1−βγs)(ρ−mcz/zcr)
mcz/zcr z4 =
(1−βγs)(ρ−(ρ−mcz/zcr)θp)
mcz/zcr and z5 =
(ρ−mcz/zcr)
βsmcz/zcr . See the technical appendix for further
details.
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3.2 Aggregate prices and inﬂation
The endogenous determination of the number of goods (establishments), nt, allows for a distinction
between the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Producer Price Index (PPI). The Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregate price level is the CPI that results from the aggregation of prices across the diﬀerentiated
goods
P ct =
 nt
0
P
1−θp
t (ω) dω
 1
1−θp
.
Next, let Pt denote the PPI in period t, obtained as the average price at the establishments
producing with the average productivity, z. As shown in the technical appendix, both price
indices are related as follows22
P ct = Ptn1/(1−θp)t . (19)
Hence, the price of the consumption bundle, P ct , increases with the producer price index Pt, and
decreases with the number of goods nt. Provided the deﬁnition of the average relative price, ρt =Pt/P ct , relation (19) implies that ρt (unit revenue for the establishment with average productivity)
depends positively on the number of goods
ρt = n1/(θp−1)t . (20)
Establishments set prices conditional to a Calvo (1983) nominal rigidity scheme. Hence, there
is a ﬁxed probability 0 < ξp < 1 that the establishment cannot set the optimal prices. If that is
the case, the establishment will automatically adjust the price by applying an indexation rule that
depends on lagged inﬂation (with a weight ιp), and on the steady state rate of inﬂation aﬀected
by a price-push exogenous shock, εpt (with a weight 1− ιp).
The PPI rate of inﬂation is πt =
P t− P t−1, evaluated at the establishments that produce with
the average productivity z. As proved in the technical appendix, the PPI inﬂation equation (New
Keynesian Phillips curve) of the model is
(πt − π) =
ιp
(1+βγsιp)
(πt−1 − π) +
βγs
(1+βγsιp)
Et (πt+1 − π)
+
(1−βγsξp)(1−ξp)
ξp(1+βγsιp)
mct − ρt+ (1−ιp)(1+βγsιp) εpt − βEtεpt+1	 , (21)
22Recalling the deﬁnitions of both the CPI and the PPI, equation (19) can be divided by its lagged version to
bring a link between the rate of CPI inﬂation, πct , and that of PPI inﬂation, πt, through the change in the number
of goods:
(1 + πct) =

nt
nt−1
 1
1−θp
(1 + πt) .
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where mct denotes the log deviation of their real marginal cost with respect to the steady-state
level, and ρt is the log ﬂuctuation of relative prices deﬁned above. In addition, β is the household
discount factor and γ is the balanced-growth rate in steady state.
The inﬂation dynamics provided by (21) are hybrid between backward-looking due to the
indexation rule on lagged inﬂation and forward-looking due to nominal rigidities on price setting.
As in Bilbiie et al. (2008) and Lewis and Stevens (2015), the gap between ﬂuctuations of the
real marginal cost and relative prices, mct − ρt, drive inﬂation variability. However, the slope
coeﬃcient is inversely determined by the Calvo probability ξp, whereas in the cited papers there
was a Rotemberg (1982)’s price adjustment cost parameter in it. Moreover, the increase in the
number of goods nt has some deﬂationary eﬀect because of its relation to relative prices ρt (variety
eﬀect). Finally, the term on the price-push shock, εpt −βγsEtε
p
t+1, brings the exogenous source for
inﬂation variability.
3.3 Central bank and government
The monetary policy of the model is described by a Taylor (1993)-type rule, of the kind used in
standard DSGE models. Thus, we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and consider that the central
bank adjusts the nominal interest rate to stabilize inﬂation and both the current and the change
in the output gap, with a partial-adjustment pattern that includes lagged nominal interest rate to
smooth down monetary policy actions,
Rt−R = µR (Rt−1 −R)+(1−µR)

µπ (πt − π) + µy (yt − ypt )+µ∆y (yt − ypt )− yt−1 − ypt−1	+εRt ,
(22)
where µπ > 1.0, µy, µ∆y ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ µR < 1 is the policy smoothing parameter. Both the
nominal interest rate and PPI inﬂation enter (22) as level deviations with respect to their steady
state values. The central bank targets PPI inﬂation πt, (and not CPI inﬂation π
c
t that shapes
the real interest rate) because optimal monetary policy in a sticky-price framework with business
formation must stabilize the producer price level (Bilbiie et al., 2008). As additional ingredients
of (22), (yt − ypt ) is the output gap between the cyclical component of output (yt) and its potential
(natural-rate) realization (ypt ), and εRt is an exogenous monetary policy shock.23
Regarding the role of the government, its ﬁscal policy consists of holding the budget constraint,
εgt = tt + exp (ε
e
t) f
enet+1 − exp (ε
x
t ) (1− τ)f
e (nxt + (n
x
t /nt−1)n
e
t) +
bt
exp(εbt)(1+rt)
− bt−1, (23)
which implies that the exogenous public expenditures on consumption goods, εgt , are ﬁnanced
23Potential output is computed assuming fully-ﬂexible prices and nominal wages.
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within the period by either collecting lump-sum taxes, tt, by obtaining net revenues from selling
operating licenses, fe exp (εet)n
E
t+1 − exp (ε
x
t ) (1 − τ )f
e (nxt + (n
x
t /nt−1)n
e
t) , and by newly issued
bonds bt that yield the real return exp (ε
e
t) (1 + rt) in the equilibrium of the bonds market.
3.4 Aggregate output
Using (20) in the Dixit-Stiglitz demand constraint, yt = (ρt)−θpyt, aggregate output can be related
to the average establishment-level production as follows
yt = n
θp
θp−1
t yt. (24)
where noticing n
θp
θp−1
t = nt

n
1
θp−1
t

and plugging the expression for n
1
θp−1
t implied by (20), ag-
gregate output can be decomposed as the number of establishments, nt, multiplied by ﬁrm-level
production in terms of consumption bundles, ρtyt,
yt = ntρtyt. (25)
The extensive margin for aggregate output ﬂuctuations is given by nt and the intensive margin
is provided by ρtyt, measured at the ﬁrms with average productivity. Finally, the equilibrium
condition for the market of bundles of consumption goods (overall resources constraint) is,24
yt = ct + it + a(ut)kt−1 + ε
g
t + ectn
e
t+1, (26)
which displays the uses of aggregate income, yt, on consumption expenditures, ct, on private
investment on capital goods, it, on the adjustments costs of variable capital utilization, a(ut)kt−1,
on the exogenous net public spending that results from the ﬁscal policy, εgt , and on the total
variable cost of planned entries, ectn
e
t+1.
The complete model with business formation is written for short-run ﬂuctuations as the set of
log-linearized set of dynamic equations available in the technical appendix.25
4 Estimation
The loglinearized model has been estimated in Dynare using the Bayesian estimation routine
(Adjemian et al., 2011) with nine exogenous processes that bring model variability: seven AR(1)
24Both the household budget constraint and the government budget constraint (23) hold for the derivation of
the overall resources constraint (see the technical appendix for the proof).
25The non-linear system of equations that determines the balanced-growth solution in steady state is also dis-
played there.
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shocks on technology, risk-premium, interest rates (monetary policy), investment adjustment costs,
ﬁscal policy, entry cost and liquidation value; and two ARMA(1,1) shocks pushing on prices and
nominal wages, respectively. The data used for the estimation consist of nine quarterly time series
including the rates of establishment entry and exit obtained in the Business Employment Dynamics
report as discussed in Section 2. All the other observable series are comparable to those used in the
estimation of the DSGE model by Smets and Wouters (2007) with three diﬀerences. First, the CPI
has been used to deﬂate the nominal series to be consistent with the model. Secondly, per-capita
series were computed dividing the aggregate series by the US working age population adjusted
by populational controls as released in the Current Population Survey of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2013). And third, we have used the series of shadow nominal interest rate calculated
by Wu and Xia (2016) in order to accommodate the eﬀects of the unconventional balance-sheet
policy actions in the zero lower bound scenario of the Great Recession.26
The sample period is constrained by data availability on US quarterly entry and exit, which
runs from 1993:2 to 2016:2. Thus, we have 93 observations. Some parameters are ﬁxed before
the estimation. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the rate of capital depreciation is set at
δ = 0.025, the labor elasticity of substitution at θw = 3.0, and the government spending, ε
g,
is assumed to be 18% of aggregate output in steady-state, εg = 0.18y. In addition, the capital
utilization rate is assumed to be equal to 100% in steady state (u = 1), when there are no costs
of variable capital utilization (a(u) = 0). The minimum ﬁrm-level productivity is normalized at
zmin = 1.0. Finally, the parameter τ , which determines the share of sunk costs at entry (licence
fee), is calibrated to imply that the total number of goods in steady state is normalized at n = 1.
This leads to choosing the value τ = 0.87.
Tables 4A and 4B display the priors and estimated posteriors found in the Bayesian estimation.
The selection of priors mostly follows Lewis and Stevens (2015) and Smets and Wouters (2007),
and we only mention here the few diﬀerences with these papers. Hence, the steady-state quarterly
rate of exit is set at a prior of x = 2.92% (slightly higher than the value assigned by Lewis and
26Hence, the observed time series obtained for the estimation are the establishment entry rate, the establishment
exit rate, the log diﬀerence in per-capita real GDP, the log diﬀerence in per-capita real Personal Consumption
Expenditures, the log diﬀerence in per-capita real Private Fixed Investment, the log diﬀerence in the real wage
obtained from the Average Hourly Earnings in the Nonfarm Business Sector, the rate of change in the GDP price
deﬂator, the Wu and Xia (2016)’s shadow Federal Funds rate, and the log of Hours of per worker obtained as
the product of the Average Weekly Hours in the nonfarm business secto and the Civilian Employment in the
Nonfarm Business Sector divided by the Civilian Labor Force. The sources to obatin these series are the Business
Employment Report from the BLS and the FRED database compiled by the St. Louis Fed. The measurement
equations and data deﬁnitions are listed in a Table available in the technical appendix.
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Stevens, 2015) in order to match the mean value obtained in US data . Regarding the variable cost
of goods creation, a quadratic speciﬁcation is assumed with ς = 2. Finally, the shape parameter of
the Pareto distribution κ takes a prior of 5.0, suﬃciently high to meet the condition of the Pareto
distribution for a well-behaved average productivity.27
Table 4A. Priors and estimated posteriors of DSGE model
Priors Posteriors
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 90% HPD interval
ς : entry cost e lastic ity Normal 2.00 0.50 2.78 [2.01, 3.66]
neec/y: steady-state entry cost over output Normal 0.01 0.0025 0.0123 [0.0094, 0.0149]
κ: ex it shap e Normal 5.00 1.50 2.51 [2.16, 2.86]
x: steady-state exit rate Gamma 0.0292 0.0025 0.0285 [0.0266, 0.0304]
θp : D ix it-Stigitz elasticity Normal 3.80 1.00 2.22 [2.06, 2.36]
µπ : inﬂation in Taylor ru le Normal 1.50 0.25 1.57 [1.30, 1.85]
µy : output gap in Taylor ru le Normal 0.12 0.05 0.01 [0.00, 0.03]
µ∆y : output gap change in Taylor rule Normal 0.12 0.05 0.18 [0.15, 0.22]
µR : inertia in Taylor ru le B eta 0.75 0.15 0.89 [0.85, 0.93]
ξp : Calvo price rig id ity Beta 0.50 0.15 0.85 [0.83, 0.88]
ξw : C alvo wage rig id ity Beta 0.50 0.15 0.98 [0.97, 0.99]
ιp : price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.58 [0.42, 0.75]
ιw : wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.15 [0.07, 0.22]
h: consumption habits B eta 0.70 0.15 0.62 [0.56, 0.69]
σc risk avers ion Normal 1.50 0.25 0.80 [0.72, 0.87]
σl : inverse Frisch elasticity Normal 2.00 0.50 1.80 [1.26, 2.37]
ϕk : capital ad j. cost elasticity Normal 4.00 1.50 3.96 [2.59, 5.52]
σa capital utilization cost elasticity Beta 0.50 0.15 0.86 [0.77, 0.95]
α:capital share in production Beta 0.36 0.10 0.13 [0.10, 0.16]
27Our prior for κ is considerably lower than the value κ = 11.51 assumed in the calibration of Hamano and
Zanetti (2017). The reason is that they choose κ to match the average US product destruction rate (6%), which is
more than two times higher than the average US establishment exit rate considered here.
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Table 4B. Priors and estimated posteriors of DSGE model, cont’d
Priors Posteriors
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 90% HPD interval
σηa : S td . dev. of techno logy innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.70 [0.60, 0.79]
σηb : S td dev of risk-prem ium innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.16 [0.13, 0.20]
σηR : Std dev of monetary innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.13 [0.11, 0.15]
σηg : Std dev of ﬁ sca l innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 1.99 [1.73, 2.23]
σηi : S td dev of investm ent innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.33 [0.26, 0.41]
σηp : Std dev of price-push innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.71 [0.41, 1.03]
σηw : Std of wage-push innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 1.23 [1.03, 1.43]
σηe : S td dev of entry cost innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 1.19 [0.67, 1.83]
σηx : S td dev of liquidation innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 1.11 [0.46, 1.91]
ρa : Auto corr. o f technology shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.81 [0.77, 0.85]
ρb: Auto corr. of risk-prem ium shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.94 [0.92, 0.96]
ρR : Auto corr. o f monetary shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.26 [0.14, 0.39]
ρg : Auto corr. of ﬁ scal sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.69 [0.58, 0.82]
ρi: Auto corr. of investment shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.65 [0.51, 0.79]
ρp : Auto corr. of price -push shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.45 [0.21, 0.72]
ρw : Auto corr. of wage-push shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.57 [0.49, 0.65]
ρe: Auto corr. of entry cost sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.83 [0.67, 0.97]
ρx: Auto corr. of liqu idation shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.54 [0.41, 0.69]
µp: MA(1) of price-push shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.49 [0.27, 0.76]
µw : MA(1) of wage-push shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.96 [0.94, 0.98]
ρga : c ross eﬀect tech .-ﬁ scal Beta 0.50 0.20 0.76 [0.55, 0.96]
We know discuss some of the results of the posterior estimates, in comparison to standard
DSGE models with no business formation (Smets and Wouters, 2007)28:
• The estimate of the coeﬃcient on household risk aversion, σc, is low (0.79), falling signiﬁcantly
below its prior value (1.5). Subsequently, the elasticity of consumption intertemporal substitution,
1/σc, turns higher due to the procyclicality of business formation.
• The model delivers a lower estimate of price stickiness (ξp at 0.85) relative to that of wage
28Obviously, we should take into account that the sample period of our estimation does not coincide with the
one used in Samets and Wouters (2007).
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stickiness (ξw at 0.98).
29 Therefore, the introduction of endogenous entry and exit results in
greater wage rigidity relative to price rigidity. This ﬁnding can be theoretically justiﬁed on the
eﬀect of wage ﬂuctuations on the exit decision through the real marginal cost. Wage adjustments
should be moderate to avoid excessive aggregate ﬂuctuations due to exit dynamics and its eﬀect
on the extensive margin. Also, the variety eﬀect in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (21), from
the model with business formation, can amplify the variability of the price inﬂation dynamics and
requires a lower Calvo probability to match the volatility of US inﬂation.
• The posterior mean estimate of the Dixit-Stiglitz demand elasticity is θp = 2.22, substan-
tially below its prior and also lower than the numbers typically used in the calibration of DSGE
models.30 This result can be explained by the additional role that plays in the model with entry
and exit. As implied by (24), the elasticity of aggregate output to variations in the total number
of establishments is inversely related to θp. The estimation method requires a small value for θp in
order to replicate the relative volatility of TPE growth with respect to real GDP growth observed
in US data.
• Regarding the parameters that characterize entry and exit dynamics (not present in standard
DSGE models), the elasticity of the entry congestion costs is estimated at ς = 2.78, which is
somewhat higher than the prior value that represents the quadratic adjustment costs. The size of
the congestion cost of entry is estimated at 1.23% of output in the detrended steady state. The
posterior estimate of the shape parameter in the Pareto distribution is substantially below its prior
at κ = 2.51. Such low estimated κ is in sharp contrast with the much higher number used in the
calibration proposed in Hamano and Zanetti (2017) for a model without an intertemporal approach
in the exit decision. Finally, the estimate of the steady-state exit rate is close to the prior rate
at x = 2.85%, which provides a good match to the sample mean of the quarterly exit rate of US
private establishments. The posterior estimates imply a critical establishment-level productivity
in steady state at zcr = 1.0116 (1.16% higher than the minimum productivity zmin = 1.00), and
an average productivity at z = 1.72.
The parameters of volatility and persistence that characterize the exogenous processes of the
model are reported in Table 4B. We are not doing a vis-à-vis comparison among them because
they do not enter the structural equations of the model with unit coeﬃcients as in the VAR
29The estimated Calvo probabilities for price and wage stickiness are numbers close to 1.0, which features the
inﬂation moderation observed in recent US business cycles (Casares and Vázquez, 2018).
30Nevertheless, Smets and Wouters (2007) report a posterior estimate for the steady-state mark-up in their
canonical DSGE model of the US economy that corresponds to value of θp = 2.67, rather similar to the one we
have found in our estimated DSGE model with business formation.
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methodology. Their role as sources of variability will be discussed below in the impulse-response
and variance decomposition analyses.
5 Business cycle analysis
Table 5 reports the key second-moment statistics of the rate of growth of aggregate output, the
rate of growth of the total number of establishments, the entry rate and the exit rate obtained
from simulations of the estimated model and their comparison to actual US statistics:
Table 5. Descriptive statistics from US business formation, 1993:2-2016:2
△yt △nt et xt
Model:
Standard deviation (relative to △yt) 1.0 0.62 0.50 0.42
Correlation with △yt 1.0 0.39 0.26 -0.29
Autocorrelation 0.31 0.77 0.87 0.69
Deviations with respect to US statistics (model-data):
Standard deviation (relative to △yt) - +0.02 +0.10 +0.07
Correlation with △yt - +0.05 -0.08 +0.02
Autocorrelation -0.05 +0.37 -0.00 -0.13
In the estimated model, the rate of growth of establishments and both the entry and exit rates
are less volatile but more persistent than aggregate output growth. Both business formation and
entry are procyclical, with a correlation with respect to output growth higher for establishment
growth (0.39) than for the entry rate (0.26). Taking lagged output growth the cyclical correlation
of both the entry rate and net business formation rise substantially (from 0.26 to 0.50 in the
case of the entry rate and from 0.39 to 0.52 for the establishments growth).31 The exit rate is
countercylical with a negative cross correlation with output growth at -0.29.
Table 5 also compares the model statistics to the ones obtained in US data. The matching
is fairly good because the quantitative diﬀerences are really small. We can mention a excessive
31The model feature this lagged reaction of entry and business formation because of the time-to-build requirement
assumed in the household choice of business creation. In US establishment data, there is also evidence on this.
For the sample period 1993:2-2016:2, the cross correlation between TPE growth and lagged real GDP growth is
0.55 (21 basis points higher than their contemporaneous correlation), whereas the cross correlation between the
establishment entry rate and lagged real GDP growth is 0.46 (12 basis points higher than the contemporaneous
correlation).
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persistence on establishment growth and a milder procyclicality of the entry rate as the most
signiﬁcant deviations between the model and the data. Anyway, the estimated model provides
a good ﬁt to second-moment statistics of US business formation, entry and exit, which makes it
adequate for the analysis of the sources of ﬂuctuations for these variables and its role on generating
aggregate ﬂuctuations of US real GDP.
Impulse-response functions
We examine the estimated impulse responses to supply-side shocks (Figure 3) and to demand-
side shocks (Figure 4). All the shocks have been normalized at the values of the estimated standard
deviations reported in Table 3B. In this exercise, we discuss how the ﬂows of establishment entry
and exit may aﬀect the propagation of shocks on aggregate output ﬂuctuations.
As Figure 3 shows, a technology shock increases the entry rate and reduces the exit rate,
which results in net business formation that pushes aggregate output growth beyond the response
observed at the ﬁrm level. In other words, the extensive margin ampliﬁes the eﬀect of a technol-
ogy shock because of the procyclical reaction of net business formation. The rate of entry rises
as households invest on business creation because average equity value moves up due to higher
expected dividends and lower interest rates. Meanwhile, the exit rate goes downhill as the critical
productivity zcr lowers with a declining real marginal cost, a higher expected aggregate output and
a higher expected unit revenue at the ﬁrms (which depends positively on the number of varieties).
As proved in the technical appendix, zcr is proportional to the average productivity of surviving
ﬁrms, which makes their log ﬂuctuations relative to steady state be identical. In Hamano and
Zanetti (2017)’s ﬂexible-price model with endogenous exit, this average productivity rises after a
recessionary technology shock. This result can be replicated in our model by reversing the sign of
the shock displayed in Figure 3.
The price-push shock corresponds to an unexpected increase in the price indexation factor
used by the fraction of ﬁrms that cannot adjust the price optimally. In turn, the relative price
charged by these ﬁrms increase and the critical productivity falls to reduce the exit rate. The rate
of growth of establishments moves up in a countercyclical way (aggregate output falls because
interest rates hike up when the central bank reacts to higher inﬂation). The average-productivity
establishment reduces the amount produced. Therefore, the price-push shock results in some
economic contraction with establishment redistribution, more business units with a lower amount
produced at the establishment level.
A wage-push shock comes from an exogenous increase in the wage indexation rule. The quan-
titative eﬀects are rather small (the lowest response of output growth across all the nine shocks of
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions from estimated supply-side shocks.
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Figure 4: Impulse-response functions from estimated demand-side shocks.
the model). The responses are the opposite to the price-push shock: the exit rate increases because
the critical productivity goes up as a consequence of the higher costs of production. Meanwhile,
the entry rate slightly falls due to the declining equity value.
The shock on the cost of entry moves down the entry rate with a one-period delay as a
consequence of the time-to-build constraint in the household portfolio choice. Figure 3 displays the
negative impact on aggregate output while the amount produced in the remaining ﬁrms increases
to oﬀset for the lack of business creation. The shock on the liquidation value increases the exit
rate and also brings some reduction of aggregate output. Meanwhile, ﬁrm-level output rises as the
number of incumbents moves down.
Figure 4 shows the responses obtained after demand-side shocks. Either a risk-premium or
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an interest-rate shock shifts the aggregate demand down as household spending on consumption
and investment goods turns lower. Such demand contraction results in a lower rate of growth for
aggregate output, for the number of ﬁrms-establishments and also for the amount of ﬁrm-level
output produced. The net business destruction is mostly explained by a procyclical reaction of
the entry rate because the exit rate barely rises (see Figure 4).32 Such signiﬁcant and persistent
fall of business creation comes justiﬁed by the lower average equity value due to the combination
of higher interest rates and lower expected dividends. Over the ﬁrst quarters after the shock,
the intensive margin absorbs the demand contraction and ﬁrms reduce their production with
no signiﬁcant business destruction. However, as time goes by, the number of establishments
keeps falling because the entry rate needs around 15 quarters to return to its steady state level.
Thus, the model with business formation reports a longer recession after risk-premium shocks in
comparison to a conventional DSGE model with constant number of establishments. The variance
decomposition examined below will corroborate this long-lasting inﬂuence of the risk premium
shock (and also interest rate shocks) on aggregate output ﬂuctuations.33
The investment shock displayed in Figure 4 represents an exogenous reduction in the adjust-
ments costs of capital accumulation, which makes it expansionary on both the demand and supply
sides of the model. The response of aggregate output is mostly driven by the intensive margin as
both ﬁrm-level output and aggregate output report similar rates of growth. The rate of establish-
ment growth is mildly procyclical as the exit rate falls beyond the decrease of the entry rate. The
lower entry rate is explained by a declining equity value that results from higher interest rates.
Meanwhile, the lower exit rate is caused by a reduction in the expected real marginal cost and
by a higher expected aggregate demand that together push the critical productivity downwards.
Finally, the ﬁscal shock brings a one-period response of aggregate output that is almost fully ab-
sorbed through a higher intensive margin reaction at the existing establishments. The entry rate
slightly decreases due to the lower average equity value (the ﬁscal expansion brings a higher in-
terest rate that crowds out the portfolio investment on equity). Exit and the critical productivity
show no signiﬁcant responses to the ﬁscal shock.
Variance decomposition
The sources of variability of US real GDP growth and establishment entry-exit rates are cap-
tured in the variance decomposition of the estimated model. Table 6 reports the percent shares
32Exit does not react considerably because the critical productivity zcr responds in a erratic way as both the
real marginal cost and aggregate output are falling to create opposing eﬀects on it.
33Furthermore, this long duration of the eﬀects of risk-premium shocks shows up in the shock decomposition of
the estimated model during the quarters that belong to the Great Recession period (2007-2016).
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obtained for the contribution of each shock in the long-run variance decomposition (inﬁnite fore-
casting horizon).34
Demand-side shocks govern most of the ﬂuctuations of the rates of growth of both aggregate
and ﬁrm-level output, with more than 62% of their variance decomposition. A predominant role
is observed for risk-premium shocks with 28.8% of aggregate output growth and 27.9% of ﬁrm-
level output growth which reﬂects the large impact of these shocks during the ﬁnancial crisis
and the Great Recession (and their persistence on aggregate ﬂuctuations as discussed in the
estimated impulse-response functions). Both monetary and ﬁscal shocks are also very inﬂuential on
ﬂuctuations of US real GDP growth (17.2% and 15.6% of the variance decomposition, respectively)
to show the active role of the Fed and the government on taking discretionary actions to stimulate
or stabilize the economy. Remarkably, the investment adjustment cost shock has a minor inﬂuence
on the variability of aggregate and ﬁrm-level activity (less than 1% share). Technology shocks
explain around 24% of ﬂuctuations in aggregate output growth and just 12% on ﬁrm-level output
growth. The price-push and, especially, the wage-push shocks do not have a signiﬁcant impact on
US aggregate ﬂuctuations. It is particularly striking that wage-push shocks have so little inﬂuence
on recent US business cycles (less than 1% on aggregate output growth and 1.6 on ﬁrm-level
output growth) as they were found quite inﬂuential over the Great Moderation period (Smets and
Wouters, 2007).
The shocks to the entry cost and to the liquidation value have some impact on aggregate
ﬂuctuations. Thus, the shock of the entry cost explains 7.3% and 8.5% of variability of the
quarterly growth rates of aggregate and ﬁrm-level output, respectively. Meanwhile, the liquidation
value (exit) shock brings cyclical ﬂuctuations that account for 2.7% of changes in output growth
and 2.6% of changes in the establishment-level output growth.
34Moreover, the technical appendix includes ﬁgures that display the quarterly shock decomposition for the US
real GDP growth, TPE growth, the entry rate and the exit rate.
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Table 6. Estimated variance decomposition (%)
Output growth decomposition Entry and exit
Aggregate
output, △y Establishments△n Firm-leveloutput, △yf Entry rateet Exit ratext
Supply-side shocks
Technology, ηa 23.8 11.6 12.4 3.7 16.3
Price-push, ηp 3.2 7.3 12.5 6.5 26.0
Wage-push, ηw 0.7 2.2 1.6 0.2 5.5
Entry cost, ηe 7.3 30.3 8.5 55.3 4.5
Liquidation, ηx 2.7 18.2 2.6 0.2 39.1
TOTAL 37.7 69.6 37.6 65.9 91.4
Demand-side shocks
Risk-premium, ηb 28.8 17.3 27.9 18.8 5.1
Interest rate, ηR 17.2 12.8 17.5 14.8 2.1
Investment, ηi 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.4
Fiscal, ηg 15.6 0.1 16.6 0.2 0.0
TOTAL 62.3 30.4 62.4 34.1 8.6
Supply-side shocks explain slightly more than 2/3 of the short-run variability of the rate of
growth of the total number of establishments: technology shocks explain 11.6%, price shocks
generate 7.3% of these changes (in a countercyclical pattern as displayed in Figure 3), entry costs
take responsibility of 30.3% through its eﬀect on business creation and the liquidation shocks bring
18.2% of variability of establishments growth because of their eﬀect on business destruction. On
the demand side, risk-premium and interest rate shocks have a relevant impact on establishment
entry that take 17.3% and 12.8% of the total variability of net business formation. The role of
investment and ﬁscal shocks is negligible.
When comparing the determinants of the entry and exit rates, we ﬁnd that demand-side shocks
explain 34.1% of the variability in the entry rate, mostly through the eﬀects of risk-premium and
interest rate shocks on equity. The ﬂuctuations of equity value are rather sensitive to risk-premium
and interest rate shocks because they have a large quantitative impact on the expected dividends,
the expected aggregate demand and the discount factor. The exogenous driver of the entry rate
(cost of entry shock) takes a signiﬁcant 55.3% share of its variance decomposition. Price-push
and technology shocks have also inﬂuence of entry rate variability with 6.5% and 3.7% shares,
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respectively.
Regarding the exit rate variability, supply-side shocks mostly explain it (91.4%) as a combi-
nation of the eﬀects from technology shocks (16.3%), price shocks (26.0%) and liquidation shocks
(39.1%). We could say that these three shocks are responsible for most of the ﬂuctuations of the
critical productivity which drives exit variability. Demand-side shocks altogether only take 8.6%
of the overall variance of the exit rate.
6 Exit and entry in the Great Recession
The empirical evidence provided in Section 2 indicates that short-run ﬂuctuations of the quarterly
rates of growth of US Total Private Establishments have turned more volatile, more persistent and
more correlated with real GDP growth after 2007. Furthermore, the empirical role of exit for US
business formation has been more important during the Great Recession than in previous periods
as documented in Table 2 and displayed in Figure 2. Next, we carry out an structural analysis of
the entry and exit dynamics to discuss the changes observed in the US economy during the Great
Recession.35
Our model with variable establishments determines the evolution in the number of incumbents
as a result of the processes of entry and exit. The decisions of both creating and destroying
establishments were carefully described in Section 3 and led to the dynamic equations for the
entry rate (11) and the exit rate (18). The posterior mean estimates of the structural parameters
can be used to calculate the numerical values of the coeﬃcients that deﬁne the entry and exit
dynamics. Using the numbers reported in Table 3A yields the estimated equations for the Full
Sample (FS) period 1993:2-2016:2
et − e = 0.43vt−1 − 0.42εet−1 + 0.0293 nst+1 − nt	 , (FSe)
xt − x = 2.44zcrt , (FSx)
which, respectively, imply a semi-elasticity of the change in the entry rate with respect to log
ﬂuctuations of lagged average equity at 0.43 and a semi-elasticity of the change in the exit rate
with respect to log ﬂuctuations of the critical productivity at 2.44. These elasticities provide a
measure of how sensitive entry and exit are to their endogenous driving factors; the average equity
35The technical appendix contains a section on the quarter-to-quarter shock decomposition of the estimated
model, which might be complementary to the analysis of entry and exit conducted here. Furthermore, there is one
speciﬁc section of that appendix that discussed the sources of ﬂuctuations of US real GDP growth during the Great
Recession.
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for entry (see equation 10) and the critical productivity for exit (see equation 17). Exogenous
factors may directly determine the evolution of the entry and exit rates through their speciﬁc
shock: the entry cost shock for entry and the liquidation value shock for exit. The estimated
model also provides information over the characteristics of these shocks through their coeﬃcients
of autocorrelation and the standard deviation of their innovations (Table 4B).
If the model is re-estimated for the Great Recession (GR) period (2007:1-2016:2), keeping
the same priors for the structural parameters, the posterior mean estimates obtained lead to the
following entry-exit equations
et − e = 0.53vt−1 − 0.54εet−1 + 0.0296 nst+1 − nt	 , (GRe)
xt − x = 3.26zcrt . (GRx)
The comparison between (FSe) and (GRe) indicates that the degree of responsiveness of the entry
rate to average equity has slightly increased during the Great Recession relative to the full sample,
but the diﬀerence is small: the semi-elasticity of the entry rate has slightly increased from 0.43
to 0.53. This change can be conﬁrmed by the reduction observed in the posterior mean estimate
of the entry cost elasticity parameter: ς = 2.78 in the full sample falls to ς = 2.42 in the Great
Recession.36
Unlike that of the entry rate, the sensitivity of the exit rate to the critical productivity rises
quite substantially: it moves up from 2.44 in (FSx) to 3.26 in (GRx). Here the key parameter is the
shape of the Pareto distribution of establishment-speciﬁc productivity, κ. It goes up from 2.51 to
3.32 when cutting the sample down to the Great Recession period. The economic interpretation is
the following: a higher estimated κ indicates a greater concentration of establishments closer to the
minimum productivity zmin after 2007. This makes the aggregate exit rate be more sensitive to the
state of the economy as the number of establishments shutting down responds more aggressively
to changes in the market conditions that determine the critical productivity (expected costs of
production, interest rates, expected demand, etc.).
The increased variability and persistence of US business formation might also be caused by
a greater role of exogenous volatility in entry and exit during the Great Recession. Let us see if
the estimates of the autocorrelation and standard deviation of the shocks that shape the entry-
exit dynamics rise in the Great Recession. Table 7 informs on the comparison. Remarkably, the
liquidation value (exit) shock has a slightly longer inertia than in the full sample (the coeﬃcient
of autocorrelation rises from 0.54 to 0.59), but with a much lower volatility of its innovations
36The technical appendix includes a Table with the posterior estimates of the model parameters in the Great
Recession sample period.
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(the standard deviation falls from 1.11% to 0.47%). The re-estimation of the entry cost shock
reports a substantial reduction in both the coeﬃcient of autocorrelation (from 0.83 to 0.52) and
the innovations volatility (from 1.19% to 0.47%), which makes it much less inﬂuential for business
creation during the Great Recession. In the variance decomposition the share of the output growth
variability explained by the entry cost shock is just 1.14%, much lower than the 7.35% found in
the full sample.
Table 7. Entry and exit dynamics
Shocks
Semi-elasticity Autocorrelation Std. deviation, %
Full sample,1993:2-2016:2
Entry e
ς
v
ec
= 0.43 ρe = 0.83 σηe = 1.19
Exit κ (1− x) = 2.44 ρx = 0.54 σηx = 1.11
Great Recession, 2007:1-2016:2
Entry e
ς
v
ec
= 0.54 ρe = 0.52 σηe = 0.47
Exit κ (1− x) = 3.26 ρx = 0.59 σηx = 0.47
Finally, the Bayesian estimation of the structural parameters determines an empirical value for
the average productivity of US establishments according to the Pareto distribution. Its theoretical
value is z = zκmin  κκ−(θp−1)1/(θp−1) which depends on a calibrated minimal productivity (ﬁxed at
zmin = 1.0) and the estimated values of both κ and θp. Plugging the values obtained as posterior
mean estimates in the full sample brings z = 1.72. Repeating the estimation exercise for the
Great Recession subsample the average plant-level productivity falls to z = 1.49. This result
might be explained by the negative eﬀect that an increase in the estimated slope coeﬃcient of
the Pareto distribution κ causes on the average productivity z. Therefore, we can say that the
higher density of establishments with low productivity after the ﬁnancial crisis has also reduced
the average productivity of incumbents. Such productivity slowdown has been recently found in
US ﬁrm-level data by Decker et al. (2017).
7 Conclusions
This paper introduces a DSGE model with endogenous business creation (entry) and destruction
(exit), in which there is a variable number of business units (establishments) that produce a single
diﬀerentiated good. The main theoretical contribution is the endogenous choice of exit, that results
from an intertemporal comparison between the present value of expected future dividends and the
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current liquidation value. Establishments shut down if the expected present-value of its future
dividends is lower than the liquidation value. A time-varying critical productivity splits up the
rates of exit and survival for incumbents. The entry decision is part of the household portfolio
choice: a new establishment is created if its prospective equity value is higher than its entry cost.
In the empirical section, we have carried out a Bayesian estimation of the DSGE model in-
cluding data on establishments entry and exit to discuss the role of business formation on US
aggregate ﬂuctuations for the quarterly period 1993:2-2016:2. Hence, the extended model delivers
ﬂuctuations of the aggregate GDP explained by either changes at the extensive margin (number of
establishments) or at the intensive margin (establishment-level production). The model provides
a good matching to the second-moment statistics of US private establishments accummulation,
entry and exit.
The simulations of the estimated model indicate that business formation is procyclical after
technology and risk-premium shocks, which ampliﬁes the eﬀect of these shocks for aggregate ﬂuctu-
ations. In either price-push or wage-push shocks the number of establishments turn countercyclical
while establishment-level production remains procyclical. Fluctuations of the rate of growth of
aggregate real GDP and establishment-level output are mostly explained by demand-side shocks
whereas supply-side shocks are the main drivers of the establishments growth. The evolution of
the entry rate depends upon both demand and supply factors with a prevalence of the former (es-
pecially, risk-premium shocks), whereas the exit rate is mainly aﬀected by supply factors (shocks
on technology, prices and liquidation value).
The estimation of the structural equations governing entry and exit dynamics show that after
2007 there has been a signiﬁcant increase in the response of the exit rate to changes in the level
of critical productivity. The implication provided by the model is that a larger concentration of
low-productivity ﬁrms speeds up the exit decisions during the Great Recession (2007-2016). In
addition, average productivity across incumbents is estimated to be lower after 2007. Nevertheless,
shocks on entry and exit have not strongly contributed to aggregate ﬂuctuations as business
formation turned more sensitive to the endogenous determinants.
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